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Abstract
A large body of research suggests mass publics are capable of thinking
coherently about international relations. We extend this body of research
to show that domain relevant postures – in our case, more abstract be-
liefs about foreign policy – are related to how tough of a line representa-
tive samples of US and UK respondents want their governments to take
toward China. More specifically, we utilize a unique comparative survey
of American and British foreign policy attitudes to show broad support
for toughness toward China. Beliefs about the use of the military and at-
titudes regarding globalization help explain preferences for tough eco-
nomic and military policies toward China. In the two countries, the
relationship between general foreign policy outlooks and the positions
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citizens take is robust to the addition of a general mediator that controls
for the general affect those surveyed have toward China. Finally, the
strength of the relationship between these abstract postures and specific
preferences for a China policy are different across the countries.
1 Introduction
Over the past three decades, political scientists gathered a steady
stream of evidence to show that citizens in multiple countries have
well-structured foreign policy attitudes (e.g. Hurwitz and Pefﬂey, 1987
[US]; Hurwitz et al., 1993 [Costa Rica]; Chittick et al., 1995 [US];
Richman et al., 1997 [US]; Bjereld and Ekengren, 1999 [Sweden];
Munton and Keating, 2001 [Canada]; Jenkins-Smith et al., 2004 [UK];
No€el et al., 2004 [Canada]; Reiﬂer et al., 2011 [UK]). Moreover, re-
search shows that citizen attitudes respond to changing international
and domestic circumstances in understandable and reasonable ways
(Shapiro and Page, 1988; Pefﬂey and Hurwitz, 1992; Wlezien, 1995;
Gelpi, 2010; Kertzer, 2013; though see Baum and Groeling, 2010 for a
more nuanced and pessimistic argument). In this article, we build on
this existing research to show that these structured abstract foreign pol-
icy beliefs (or ‘postures’) help explain American and British policy
preferences toward China. Speciﬁcally, we utilize hierarchical constraint
models (e.g. Hurwitz and Pefﬂey, 1987) to show that speciﬁc attitudes
about China policy ﬂow from foreign policy postures. We ﬁnd that
both security and economic postures are relevant in explaining support
for toughness toward China.
There are important differences in the salience of China as an issue
when the US and UK are compared to one another.1 In the United
1 By way of illustration, we utilized the Factiva database and conducted searches for articles
with the terms ‘China’ and either ‘Military’ or ‘Economy’ that appeared in The New York
Times (NYT), The Telegraph, The Guardian, and The Daily Mail over the course of the two
weeks prior to the surveys entering the field (16 January–31 January, 2013). On the military
aspect, coverage in the NYT is much different from what appears in the three large circula-
tion (but ideologically distinct) British papers. In the former, multiple articles focus on the
potential for military confrontations between the United States and China as a result of
China’s territorial dispute with Japan over islands in the East China Sea. Other coverage fo-
cuses on President Obama’s interest in building up US military strength in Asia to counter
the growth of the Chinese military and the potential for China to engage in cyber-attacks
on US government and businesses. In the British papers, there was coverage of the
Chinese–Japanese territorial dispute and the potential for a US–China military confronta-
tion, but little mention of British military interests or involvement.
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States, issues involving engagement with China – from economic and
trade competition to the possibilities of military tension – frequently
appear in the news. In the UK, less news coverage is devoted to China
overall and in particular, there is less news reporting dedicated to the
prospect of economic or military conﬂict between China and Great
Britain. This article exploits this difference by comparing the inﬂuence
of foreign policy postures on China attitudes across these contexts. We
ﬁnd foreign policy beliefs of Americans to be more closely linked
to the level of toughness they demand of their Government’s China
policies. However, this is not to say that foreign policy postures are ir-
relevant for British attitudes toward China; postures are signiﬁcant pre-
dictors of China preferences in the UK as well. We also ﬁnd that the
relevance of the postures is robust to adding a ‘likability heuristic’ or
feeling thermometer toward China to the model – that is these broad
beliefs have a direct effect on preferences for getting tough in two pol-
icy domains even after controlling for how these beliefs inﬂuence affect
toward China.
2 On and Off the Radar: China opinion in the
United States and UK
2.1 America and China
There is a long history of polling Americans on the issue of China –
measuring American attitudes toward the threat posed by the People’s
Republic is commonplace in the wake of Mao’s triumph in 1949 and
the Chinese involvement in the Korean War. Moreover, trends in
On the economic front, the NYT ran two stories mentioning environmental degradation
accompanying China’s economic rise, with one piece mentioning Republican claims that
the United States could not compete with China economically with stricter environmental
regulations. In contrast, limited discussion in The Telegraph centered on how Britain’s
tough visa regime hurt the UK economy because it limited tourism, students, and invest-
ment from China, and a brief report suggested Mandarin be taught to British schoolchil-
dren so that UK businesses could take full advantage of China’s expansion (25 January
2013). At least in the short time period covered, the tone of the articles in British papers
suggest that a more open relationship with China might help the UK reap the benefits of
China’s economic rise. A more extensive time series analysis would be necessary to convinc-
ingly determine whether media coverage drives attitudes toward China. However, it does
appear that the media messages British and American respondents receive are different,
particularly when it comes to the military threat posed by China.
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American attitudes toward China feature important shifts over time.
Americans view China as a primary threat in the 1950s and 1960s, but
views soften somewhat in the 1970s (Kusnitz, 1984). However, there is
important variation underneath these more gradual shifts. One example
comes from the Truman Administration; Republicans were much more
critical of Sino-American policies, likely attributable to the view that
the Democratic President was responsible for ‘losing China’ [and
Korea] to the Communists (Wittkopf, 1990).
At other points in time, public opinion appears to have played an
important role in the policymaking calculus of American leaders. Foyle
(1997) details how President Eisenhower and Secretary of State John
Foster Dulles turn against unilateral action in the defense of Taiwan
from mainland Communist China in the early 1950s because of a per-
ception of a divide in domestic public opinion. Similarly, Rusk and
Papp (1990) notes Kennedy’s caution in his engagement with the
China issue and attributes this reticence to a fear of negative public re-
action toward proposed White House policies.
While Eisenhower and Kennedy appear to allow concerns over pub-
lic opinion to constrain action vis-a-vis China, Steele (1966) sees a pub-
lic open to a more ﬂexible and engaged policy during thaws in the
Cold War. By the 1970s, the initiatives of Nixon and Carter help to im-
prove both relations between the two countries and Americans’ views
of China, but attitudes sour considerably after the violent suppression
of student protestors in Tiananmen Square. Ultimately, Holsti (2004)
describes the American public’s reactions to China and the policies
they want their state to pursue as ‘events driven’ and ‘rational’.
Citizens cool when China engages in policies that threaten the United
States, but warm when elites make overtures toward working with one
another.
Page and Bouton (2006) observe that by the early 2000s Americans
overwhelmingly favor maintaining diplomatic relations with China and
believe that the United States has a vital interest in engagement with
China. In particular, the authors note a shift in American priorities to-
ward matters of trade and economic commitments. Page and Xie
(2010) show that Americans see the beneﬁts China can provide in
terms of the availability of cheap imports, but they also believe that the
Chinese do not play fair when trading with the United States. On the
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military front, a slim majority of Americans want to work hard to con-
tain Chinese military power, but only a minority are willing to see the
United States mobilize ground forces against China’s large military if
the latter invades Taiwan (Page and Bouton, 2006; Page and Xie,
2010).
2.2 Britain and China
Measurements of British attitudes toward China are sparse and infre-
quent. Early work by Younger (1955) speculates that public opinion is
not as relevant in the UK as it is in the United States in shaping elite
actions when dealing with Communist China. With some limited ex-
ceptions (e.g. Hong Kong), the British public’s attitudes toward China
rarely appear as a topic of conversation in media or academic journals
(Hoge, 1997). In contrast, British elites do see the rise of China as a
‘driver of change’ that will affect the UK in the coming decades. There
are some conjectures that European public opinions toward China can
harden if trade moves away from the import of low cost Chinese basic
goods into the European Union and to ﬂooding British and EU mar-
kets with high quality goods that rival those produced by domestic in-
dustries (Jacques, 2009).
British policymakers and their European counterparts also treat the
rise of China as a military power with less suspicion than their
American allies. Like the United States, the EU maintains an arms em-
bargo on China, but opinions as to the appropriateness of maintaining
bans on weapons sales is a topic more open to debate among
European policymakers (Dai, 2009). The rise of China simply is less sa-
lient in Europe than it is in the United States, and elites are less likely
at this point in time to view China as an imminent threat. However,
this may change if more attention is paid to the country by elites, if
trade wars heat up, or human rights practices by China catch the at-
tention of activists in UK and across Europe.
Compared with the British, Americans hear more about China’s sta-
tus as a growing superpower in the media and the potential challenges
this poses to US dominance (Peng, 2004; Stone and Xiao, 2007).
Studies also ﬁnd that the BBC’s coverage of China is robust but does
not focus on the impact of China’s rise on the UK (Seib and Powers,
2010). This difference and the lack of worry by policymakers suggest
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that British attitudes concerning their country’s China policy will not
be as well formulated and that predictors of the public’s attitudes in
the UK likely will be weak and more difﬁcult to establish.
3 Sources of specific attitudes toward China
Our primary interest in this article is to understand better American
and British attitudes toward China. By attitudes we do not just mean
how those residing in these two western states view China generally,
but rather the toughness of the policies they want their country to pur-
sue in two policy realms most relevant to bilateral and multilateral re-
lations – trade and military engagement. We demonstrate below that
UK and US citizens possess abstract foreign policy attitudes that retain
the same structure in both states. A direct linkage between abstract
policy views and demands for toughness toward China in two different
policy spheres is suggestive of higher order thinking both about foreign
policy, in general, and the stance people believe their country should
take toward China, speciﬁcally.
Suggestive evidence of an even higher level of thinking on the part
of citizens occurs if the postures have different relationships to each of
the citizen demands for tough military and trade policies. As there are
multiple substantive factors, partisan differences, and standard control
variables that can be related to attitudes toward China, we ﬁrst elabo-
rate and justify the independent variables to appear in the multivariate
models below.
3.1 Our key variables of theoretical interest – foreign policy
postures
A cottage industry of research shows that American attitudes about
foreign policy have a coherent multi-dimensional structure. The exact
number and content of dimensions is a function of the available data
and the modelling strategy. Nonetheless, a dominant theme in the
work is that peoples’ beliefs about the strength and proper use of their
country’s military (militarism) is separate from attitudes toward the
appropriateness of employing instruments of soft power such as the
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dispersal of foreign aid (liberal internationalism) (e.g. Wittkopf, 1986,
1990).2 Although less well studied, these dimensions appear to hold ap-
proximately among the UK public as well (e.g. Reiﬂer et al., 2011).
The most relevant forerunner for our present analysis is the seminal
article by Hurwitz and Pefﬂey (1987) on belief systems and foreign af-
fairs. Dimensions extracted via factor analysis reveal postures or a mid-
dle ground between an individual’s core beliefs and their positions on
speciﬁc policy issues. We emulate many features of Hurwitz and
Pefﬂey’s analysis – we include variables that tap the three postures of
isolationism, militarism, patriotism (or ethnocentrism as Hurwitz and
Pefﬂey call it), and include in the models controls for economic evalua-
tions and partisan identiﬁcation. Within this hierarchical framework,
we make a number of speciﬁc predictions about sources of support for
toughness toward China.
We ﬁrst turn to isolationism. Isolationists want to avoid unnecessary
entanglements beyond state borders. This should lead those high in
this sentiment to shy away from wishing their government to pursue
policies other states may view as provocative. Consequently, we expect:
H1: Higher levels of isolationism present among respondents from the
United States and Great Britain co-varies with a reduced propensity to
support the government pursuing tough military and economic policies
toward China.
An isolationism dimension taps respondents’ attitudes for how they
want their state to interact with other countries across a variety of is-
sues. In contrast, a militarism dimension captures citizens’ beliefs that
their country’s military should be strong and ready for action if the
country’s interest requires its use – either to keep it secure from attack
or project its values and power (Page and Bouton, 2006). A citizenry
2 This militarism vs. liberal internationalism separation is not the only approach to under-
standing key points of conflict in the dimensionality debate. Some scholars make the case
for a separate ‘isolationist–internationalist’ dimension arguing that militarism and liberal
internationalism dimensions describe how the people think their country should engage
with the world but an isolationism dimension is necessary to tap whether respondents want
their state to engage with the world at all (Kegley and Wittkopf, 1982; Rathbun, 2007,
p. 387). This debate is largely orthogonal to our specific focus, which is to show that foreign
policy postures serve as prominent covariates of citizen demands for tough China policies
from their governments.
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that thinks more deeply about engagement with China is prone to uti-
lize different dimensions when responding to different aspects of their
state’s China policy. If this higher level of awareness holds, empirical
estimations should establish that:
H2: Respondents’ positions on the militarism dimension are more
closely tied to their preferences for a tough state military policy
toward China than they are for a tough economic policy toward China.
Hurwitz and Pefﬂey (1987) treat preferences for free trade as a spe-
ciﬁc issue, but we contend that attitudes toward globalization are prop-
erly thought of as a midlevel posture. As is the case with the militarism
posture, we consider evidence of higher ordered citizen thinking about
their state’s China policy to occur if:
H3: Respondent support for globalization has a significant and
negative association with their preferences for a tough state economic
policy toward China. The magnitude of this linkage is larger than the
relationship between globalization and preferences for a tough military
policy.
The three latent variables, whose structure and measurement we de-
scribe below, differ in that isolationism is expected to co-vary signiﬁ-
cantly with preferences for both a strong economic and military policy.
If citizens think deeply about how their country should react to the
multifaceted rise of China, preferences for globalization should be
more closely linked to attitudes about the level of toughness of their
country’s economic policy while preferences for militarism should have
a stronger association with demands for a tough military policy toward
China.
3.2 Additional variables of interest
Partisanship
We have divergent cross-country expectations about the role parti-
sanship should play as a ‘perceptual screen’ (cf. Lewis-Beck et al.,
2008) when it comes to shaping citizen preferences toward their coun-
try’s international relations with China. In contemporary America, it
seems that on nearly all issues there are noticeable differences in the
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policy opinions of Republicans and Democrats (Jacobson, 2010).
Consequently, we expect this also to apply to the issue of China and
we will observe differences between Republicans and Democrats on
preferences for toughness, even after controlling for other variables.
This expectation requires further explanation as there is a burgeon-
ing debate in the literature concerning the role of partisanship in
inﬂuencing American attitudes toward China. Some argue that parti-
sanship (and ideology) primarily has an indirect effect on foreign pol-
icy preferences by affecting perceptions of threat and more abstract
foreign policy goals (e.g. Page and Bouton, 2006 for a general argu-
ment, and Page and Xie, 2010 for a more China speciﬁc argument).
Peter Gries (2011, 2014a,b) critiques this approach arguing that parti-
sanship and ideology play an important role in shaping Americans’ at-
titudes far more directly. In the case of China, the more direct effects
of partisanship are rooted in a greater antipathy toward communism.
Our expectation is that for the United States, partisanship will reach
statistical signiﬁcance. Of course, a signiﬁcant partisanship variable in
the models we present does not necessarily validate or repudiate one or
the other of these competing theoretical accounts. However, given the
ubiquity of partisanship in explanations of American political opinions
and behavior, we tend to favor an interpretation where partisanship
has at least some direct inﬂuence on the content of both general for-
eign policy preferences and China attitudes more speciﬁcally.
In UK, research suggests that there are partisan differences in for-
eign policy beliefs – those more supportive of the use of force have
a higher affect toward the Conservative Party and its leader, while
those who ﬁt the mold of ‘cooperative internationalists’ feel warmly to-
ward the Liberal Democrats (Reiﬂer et al., 2011). In practice, however,
British parties have a habit of not differentiating themselves in a clear
and meaningful way on foreign policy. Even on the salient matters of
military interventions in Libya and Afghanistan, the similarity in
party positions limits the ability to observe elite inﬂuence (Reiﬂer
et al., 2014). Consequently, we expect that partisan attachments will
have little impact on British preferences for toughness toward China. In
summary:
H4: The long term attachments of Americans to a political party, as
represented by their responses to a standard partisan identification
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question, will significantly influence the degree of toughness they seek
from their country’s China policies—Democratic respondents will
favor a softer approach while Republicans will demand toughness. In
Great Britain, respondents’ partisan affiliations will have little direct
effect on attitudes toward the approach the UK government should
take toward China.
Economic perceptions
A fundamental variable motivating political behavior and voting is citi-
zens’ perceptions of the state of the economy (e.g. van der Brug et al.,
2007; Duch and Stevenson, 2008). Page and Bouton (2006) note that
Americans pay attention to their own economic interests when thinking
about trade and globalization, and this leads to our hypothesis that:
H5: Economic evaluations affect support for toughness on China.
Those who have more negative evaluations of the economy or
household finances will support greater toughness toward China.
Ethnocentrism/patriotism
Classic work in social psychology holds that foreign countries are so-
cially acceptable targets for the projection and displacement of anxi-
eties (Silverstein, 1989). Hurwitz and Pefﬂey (1987) label the belief in
national superiority ‘ethnocentrism’ and place it as a core value that
predicts positions on postures and only indirectly inﬂuences speciﬁc
foreign policy issues. Given a wider range of indicators available to us,
we examine the link between blind patriotism (cf. Schatz et al., 1999;
Huddy and Khatib, 2007) and preferences for tougher China policies.
Like ethnocentrism, the measure of patriotism we describe below taps
agreement with a belief in the superiority of one’s country. However,
our measure also incorporates beliefs about the appropriateness of
blindly following the government’s policies. We expect that:
H6: There is a direct and positive relationship between respondents’
agreement that citizens should blindly support US/UK policies and
those who want tougher policies toward China.
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The likeability heuristic
Recent work by Peter Gries (2014b, p. 43) asserts that ‘gut feelings to-
ward foreign countries serve as a vital mediator between ideological pre-
dispositions on the one hand, and speciﬁc foreign policy preferences on
the other.’ Our interpretation of this position is that the immediate ante-
cedent to preferences for toughness vis-a-vis China is how warmly one
feels toward China, and that other variables inﬂuence one’s warmth to-
ward China. If this approach is correct, then once a feeling thermometer
is added to the model as a mediator, much of the direct relationships we
observe between postures, partisanship, patriotism, and economic evalu-
ations should weaken signiﬁcantly. We depart slightly from Peter Gries
(2014b) and examine whether mediation via a China feeling thermome-
ter occurs for ﬁve key variables in our primary analysis.
H7: Respondents’ support for a tough China policy in both the
economic and military policy realms operates via general affect toward
China.
The greater salience of China in the United States compared with
Great Britain leads us to cross-country expectations concerning the ri-
val hypotheses presented above:
H8: The covariates described in this section will have better
explanatory power in explaining citizen preferences for tough China
policies in the United States than in Great Britain.
H9: Americans will utilize different postures to inform their foreign
policy preferences toward China in the economic and military domains
while the influence of the postures will be more even across the two
policies among the less informed British respondents.
4 Data, variables, and methods
4.1 Data and dependent variables
In February 2013, 1,891 British and 1,858 American respondents com-
pleted the third wave of a YouGov online panel survey explicitly ﬁelded
for the purposes of better understanding the foreign policy attitudes of
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both publics.3 Two outcome variables come from this wave of the sur-
vey. These are (i) a question asking respondents ‘Thinking about US/
UK policy toward China, do you think it is important to be tough
with China on economic and trade issues?’; and (ii) a question asking
respondents ‘Thinking about US/UK policy toward China, do you
think it is important to be tough with China on military issues?’
Available responses to these two questions falls along a four point or-
dinal scale ranging from ‘No, not at all important’ to ‘Yes, very impor-
tant’, and the question is similar to one employed by the Pew Research
Centre in a recent China focused survey.4 In the last set of multivariate
analyses below, we employ a 101 point ‘feeling thermometer’ as a me-
diator. This probe provides respondents with a scale ranging from 0 to
100, with 0 labeled ‘very coldly’ and 100 labeled ‘very warmly’, and
3 YouGov’s methodology for ensuring the samples are reasonably representative of target
populations differs slightly across the two countries: In the United States, respondents to
the YouGov survey are drawn by matched quota sampling from a non-probability sample
of over 1 million volunteer panelists who take the surveys in exchange for prizes or cash.
The methodology for YouGov’s procedures is described in Rivers (2007) and Ansolabehere
and Schaffner (2014) report the high comparability of estimations utilizing this method to
those obtained utilizing standard nationally representative RDD telephone interviewing. In
the UK, YouGov builds a sample by drawing from its respondent panel of over 350,000
Britons who have signed up to take surveys in exchange for entries into prize draws or
points on an account that eventually can be redeemed for a cash prize. The methodology
for YouGov’s UK procedures is reported by Sanders et al. (2007) to yield multivariate re-
sults that are highly comparable to estimates obtained utilizing responses from probability
sampling with face-to-face interviewing. To obtain a sample that approximately is represen-
tative of Great Britain (Northern Ireland is excluded from the sampling frame), specific
surveys are opened to a subset of the panel that is representative of the known population
in terms of age, gender, class, and newspaper readership in Britain. In the multivariate anal-
yses, post-sampling weights are employed to bring the sample further into line with the
population’s known characteristics as derived from either the national census or a large
scale probability sample (e.g. the Current Population Survey in the United States or the
National Readership Survey in the UK). Details on the observed and weighted characteris-
tics of the US and UK samples are presented in the Online Appendix, but the big difference
between the observed and weighted demographic characteristics of the panel lie with the
underestimation of youth who participated in both samples. Attrition from this demo-
graphic mimics what is observed in probability based panel studies as is the underrepresen-
tation of minorities and those of lower socio-economic status (see Watson and Wooden,
2009 and Lipps, 2009).
4 Pew Research Global Attitudes Project (2012). The middle categories are ‘No, Not too im-
portant’ and ‘Yes, Somewhat important.’ Don’t know responses to the two toughness ques-
tions and the thermometer scale are classified as missing cases and modeled as a function
of the observed covariates. The order the two toughness questions appear on the surveys
randomly are alternated. Fieldwork was funded by a grant to Thomas Scotto from the
Economic and Social Research Council of the UK (ESRC).
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asks them to evaluate ‘China’ in general – not the Government,
Chinese people, or in any other context.
4.2 Independent variables
Hypothesized covariates for the multivariate models derive from the in-
terviewees’ responses to questions asked on November 2011 and May/
June 2012 waves of the survey. To improve the reliability and validity
of key independent variables of interest, we hypothesize multiple survey
indicators to be reﬂective of latent factors of each concept. Below, we
employ Conﬁrmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) to ensure that the factor
structure is valid; these analyses employ a robust weighted least squares
estimator to enable us to derive the latent variables by appropriately
treating responses to the agree–disagree survey questions as ordinal. A
brief description of the indicators follows, but for the sake of brevity,
we relegate full question wording of the items, the wave each item ap-
pears on the survey and response distributions to the online
Supplementary Appendix.
4.3 Latent variables
i. Militarism Posture: A latent variable where higher scores motivate posi-
tive responses to questions asking whether respondents think military
spending should be increased and agreement with a question as to
whether the respondent believes that their country should be willing to
use force in the face of expansionist aggression by another state.
ii. Isolationism Posture: A latent variable where those scoring highly on
the dimension are prone to agree with survey questions asking whether
their country should avoid involvement with other countries, whether
getting involved in other states risks the wellbeing of domestic citizens,
and whether their country should simply mind its own business in its
conduct of foreign policy.
iii. Globalization Posture: A latent variable where those scoring highly have
a propensity to believe increases in trade between countries has a posi-
tive outcome on the respondent and their families, domestic factory
workers, the domestic economy writ large, domestic consumers, and
domestic businesses.
iv. Patriotism: Respondents high on the negative form of patriotism likely
agree that people who do not back the state’s policies should live else-
where, people should support policies simply because they are the
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policies of the country, people should avoid saying bad things about
the country, their state is always correct in matters of international af-
fairs, and that the country has the moral high ground in policymaking.
v. Economic Performance Perceptions: Respondents scoring high on this
factor tend to agree to four survey questions asking whether their own
and the country’s economy performed better in the past year and
would do so in the next year.
4.4 Observed variables
i. Partisan Identiﬁcation: Dichotomous variables capture whether, in the
United States, the respondent is a Democrat or Republican, and, in the
UK, whether the respondent is a supporter of Labor, the Conservatives,
the Liberal Democrats, the Greens, UKIP, or one of the two nationalist
parties (Scottish Nationalists or Plaid Cyrmu).
ii. Other Controls: The estimations below consider or control for the im-
pact of the following social-demographic variables on attitudes toward
China: age, gender, university education or not, region (South in the
United States, Wales and Scotland in the UK), religious denomination
(Protestant/Church of England, Catholic, other Christian, other reli-
gion), income (via dichotomous high and middle income controls) and
race (African-American, Hispanic, and Asian in the United States, non-
white in the UK).
4.5 Methods
Conducting valid cross-cultural multivariate analyses to compare
American and British attitudes toward China ﬁrst requires determining
whether the factor structure of the hypothesized latent covariates is
similar enough to argue that their meaning is roughly equivalent across
the two states (see Davidov et al., 2011). Multiple-group analysis in a
CFA framework is the method used to establish this validity (Byrne,
2012).
The second step is, for each country, to estimate simultaneously via
ordered probit the two toughness variables on the factors, partisan
identiﬁcation and control variables. One of our key interests is the de-
gree to which respondents bring different judgments to bear on getting
tough with China on economic and military matters. To examine this
question, we tested whether the co-variation between independent and
dependent variables are statistically equivalent to one another across
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the two policy spaces. To more easily see when and where there is (and
is not) a discernible difference in how independent variables are associ-
ated with the two dependent variables we use equality constraints. If an
equality constraint is warranted (that is, the independent variable has
the same effect on economic toughness as it does on military tough-
ness), the table reports a single coefﬁcient in a country. If the indepen-
dent variable has an unequal effect on the economic and military
dependent variables, the table reports two coefﬁcients. By doing this,
we can more clearly see which variables affect support for economic
and military toughness differently, and where a variable is just generally
associated with greater toughness toward China.5 To foreshadow our
results, most of the time we can impose an equality constraint – that is
the independent variable in question affects economic and military
toughness equally (this is true on all variables for the UK sample, and
all but three variables for the US sample).
The ﬁnal step is to determine the degree to which affect toward
China, as represented by a feeling thermometer, mediates the rela-
tionship between postures and policy. If citizen attitudes about the pol-
icies the US and UK governments should pursue toward China are
mostly caused by general affect toward China, the addition of the feel-
ing thermometer as a predictor should render the coefﬁcients for the
direct paths between the threat variables and substantive variables
insigniﬁcant.
5 Results
5.1 Evaluations of China
The February 2013 surveys ask British and American respondents to
evaluate a number of countries on the 101 point feeling thermometer,
and the average score those in the survey give to each country appears
5 More specifically, we are using seemingly unrelated ordered probit (SOP) with equality con-
straints. In other words, we are simultaneously running two ordered probit models and test-
ing the equivalence of slopes across these two models. SOP models also allow the error
terms of the two ordinal outcome variables to covary. Efficiency gains are obtained in si-
multaneous estimation (Kennedy, 2003).
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in Figure 1. Citizens of both states feel cool toward China. Not sur-
prisingly, they feel warmest toward their own country and generally
feel more warm than cool toward Canada. The European countries in
the feeling thermometer battery receive relatively high scores. At the
opposite end of the spectrum lay two Arab states in the midst of tur-
moil, Egypt and Libya. Americans rate China lower than Egypt
(t¼2.60, P< 0.01) while the British are more generous toward the
former than the latter but still cool (t¼ 9.09, P< 0.001). In short, most
peoples of both states are not Sinophiles.
Respondents from both countries also desire their politicians to pur-
sue a ‘tough’ China policy. Table 1 provides distributions for the two
main dependent variables of interest. Comparing across the two coun-
tries, the key difference is that Americans are prone to believe that
tough China policies in the economic and military arenas are ‘very’ in-
stead of ‘somewhat’ important. British responses cluster in the latter
category, and they are slightly more likely than Americans to declare
that tough China policies are ‘not too important’.
Britons and Americans are slightly more supportive of tough eco-
nomic and trade policies toward China than they are of placing
importance on their country taking tough military stances against
this state. However, the take away point is that support for tough
policies pervades both policy realms. Although the response distribu-
tions are signiﬁcantly different from one another in both countries, the
polychoric correlations are 0.74 in the UK and 0.79 in the United
States.
5.2 Factor structure
Before multivariate analyses to test the above hypotheses commence, it
is imperative to obtain scores of the latent variables that are valid
within countries and functionally equivalent across states. Table 2 pre-
sents the results of a CFA where the unstandardized factor loadings
and thresholds on the ordinal responses to the survey questions are
constrained to be equal across countries. As is evident from the Table,
the standardized factor loadings are strong, and the ﬁt of the model,
while not exact ðv2WLSMV¼ 1; 541:214; P < 0:001Þ, approximately
matches the data structure (RMSEA¼ 0.04) even when equality
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Table 1 Thinking about (a) UK and (b) US Policy toward China, do you think it is impor-
tant to be tough with China on. . .
Economic and
trade issues
Military
issues
(a) UK
No, not at all important 1% 2%
No, not too important 15 16
Yes, somewhat important 58 52
Yes, very important 26 30
v
2¼12.64 (3df, P¼0.005) 100% (weighted
n¼1468)
100% (weighted
n¼1460)
Mean¼3.10
SD¼0.66
Mean¼3.10
SD¼0.72
(b) US
No, Not at all important 2% 2%
No, Not too important 6 8
Yes, Somewhat Important 41 43
Yes, Very Important 51 47
v
2¼11.56 (3df, P¼0.009) 100% (weighted
n¼1643)
100% (weighted
n¼1575)
Mean¼3.42
SD¼0.69
Mean¼3.35
SD¼0.70
Note: Variables treated as ordinal in multivariate analyses.
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Figure 1 Average feeling thermometer scores.
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Table 2 CFA model of independent variables
Latent factor Indicator UK US
Militarism Strong military to be effective in IR. 0.79 0.69
Increase military spending 0.81 0.87
Globalization
Positive Effect On
UK/US factory workers 0.64 0.77
Respondent and family 0.81 0.85
UK/US economy 0.89 0.93
Avg. UK/US consumer 0.81 0.82
UK/US businesses 0.86 0.79
Isolationism/
Internationalism
UK/US interests protected by avoiding
involvement
0.81 0.82
UK/US shouldn’t risk citizen happiness by
involvement
0.74 0.74
UK/US mind own business when it comes to
international affairs
0.79 0.82
Economic
Evaluations
Economic performance of country in past 12
months
0.8 0.89
Personal finances in last 12 months 0.69 0.68
Personal finances in next 12 months 0.75 0.75
Economic situation of country in next 12
months
0.85 0.88
Patriotism People who do not support UK/US should live
elsewhere
0.68 0.77
I support UK/US policies for the very reason
they are policies of my country.
0.74 0.75
There is already enough criticism of UK/US
abroad. . .don’t say bad things.
0.62 0.71
In international affairs, UK/US virtually always
right.
0.74 0.79
UK/US policies always the morally correct
ones.
0.77 0.79
Notes: Estimation of ordinal indicators via the WLSMV estimator as implemented
in Mplus 7.3. Factor loadings are standardized; unstandardized factor loadings con-
strained to equivalence. Overall fit of the model: v2¼1541.214 (338df); RMSEA 0.04;
CFI¼0.94. v2 Contribution from UK group¼705.568 and v2 Contribution from US
group¼835.646.
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constraints are placed on the loadings.6 This approximate ﬁt suggests
that the ‘meanings’ of the latent variables – the three postures, the
measure of patriotism/ethnocentrism, and economic evaluations, are
the same across the two states and valid cross-country comparisons are
possible.
Differences in latent means tests suggest that Britons are more milita-
ristic (0.241), believe that globalization has a positive impact (0.244), and,
surprisingly, more patriotic (0.207) than Americans. Circa early 2013,
British economic outlooks, however, are much more negative (0.735).7
5.3 Direct relationship
For each country, the two toughness variables simultaneously are re-
gressed on the factors, whose valid structure derives from Table 2, as
well as partisanship and socio-demographic controls. In a ﬁrst step, the
estimations of the magnitudes of the coefﬁcients for the latent and ob-
served covariates can vary across the two outcome variables measuring
the importance respondents place on their state pursuing tough eco-
nomic and military policies toward China. One by one, equality con-
straints on coefﬁcients and v2
WLSMV
difference tests determine whether
the ﬁt of the model declines when the assumption that the independent
variables have an equal effect on each of the outcome variables is in
force. Table 3 presents the standardized coefﬁcients from the ﬁnal
estimations.8
6 Standardized loadings differ slightly across states because the co-variances between the la-
tent variables and indicators are allowed to vary freely across countries. Notable differences
include the fact that Isolationism has a small negative correlation with militarism (0.09)
in the United States but the two latent variables have a small positive association in the UK
(0.19). There is a moderate negative correlation between militarism and economic well-
being in the United States, but this relationship does not obtain in the UK. Full results for
the CFA are available upon request. The Root Mean Square Error of Approximation is a
commonly employed approximate fit statistic employed in Structural Equation Modeling,
and scores of below 0.05 are judged to have very good near fit (Byrne, 2012).
7 Factor scores have a range from 2.257 to 2.304. American latent variable means are fixed
to zero to allow for comparisons.
8 Interpret the standardized continuous independent covariates such that a one standard de-
viation unit change in the covariate associates with a slope change in the underlying latent
response to the categorical toughness variables. For the binary independent variables, a
move from 0 to 1 corresponds to a slope change in the underlying latent response to the cat-
egorical toughness variables. Coefficients obtained via the ordered probit WLSMV estima-
tor in Mplus 7.3.
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Table 3 Covariates of economic and military toughness, UK and United States
Seemingly unrelated probit
(with equality constraints)
Predictor UK Economic
and Military
Toughness
US Economic
toughness
US Military
toughness
Militarism 0.150*** 0.346***
(0.038) (0.049)
Globalization 0.088* 0.225** 0.108**
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040)
Isolationism/Internationalism 0.170*** 0.009
(0.040) (0.035)
Economic Evaluations 0.009 0.091*
(0.039) (0.036)
Patriotism 0.094* 0.102* 0.040
(0.041) (0.047) (0.047)
Age 0.015 0.233***
(0.053) (0.037)
Non-White British/
African American
0.010 0.215†
(0.096) (0.128)
Hispanic American — 0.238†
(0.136)
Asian American — 0.633**
(0.215)
University Educated 0.210* 0.107
(0.088) (0.070)
Church of England/Protestant 0.282* 0.231*
(0.110) (0.094)
Catholic 0.300* 0.175†
(0.141) (0.105)
Other Christian 0.116 0.173
(0.131) (0.119)
Other Religion 0.356*** 0.092
(0.105) (0.140)
Scotland 0.086
(0.122)
Wales 0.070
(0.167)
(continued)
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Table 3 Continued
Seemingly unrelated probit
(with equality constraints)
Predictor UK Economic
and Military
Toughness
US Economic
toughness
US Military
toughness
South USA – 0.023
(0.071)
High Income 0.090 0.004
(0.115) (0.088)
Middle Income 0.032 0.097
(0.119) (0.085)
Male 0.251*** 0.052 0.082
(0.077) (0.078) (0.075)
Conservative (UK)/Republican
(US) Identifier
0.032 0.234**
(0.112) (0.080)
Labour Identifier (UK)/Democratic
(US) Identifier
0.070 0.145†
(0.104) (0.086)
Liberal Democrat Identifier (UK only) 0.083
(0.150)
UKIP Identifier (UK only) 0.152
(0.155)
Plaid Cyrmu/SNP Identifier (UK only) 0.414
(0.284)
Green Identifier (UK only) 0.216
(0.191)
R2 0.107 0.274 0.268
†P<0.10, ***P<0.001, **P<0.01, *P<0.05.
Notes: Simultaneous unrelated ordered probit estimation via the WLSMV estimator as
implemented in Mplus 7.3. Latent predictors are indicated in boldface. While we are si-
multaneously estimating two ordered probit models for each country, we only report a
single coefficient when slopes are equivalent across models. All UK predictors con-
strained to equality. US predictors constrained to equality for all variables except
Globalization, Patriotism, and Male. UK n¼1891, US n¼1859. Difference Test for UK
equality constraints (vs. unconstrained model): v2¼24.286 (df¼23) P¼0.388. Difference
Test for imposed US equality constraints (vs. unconstrained model): v2¼14.087 (df¼17)
P¼0.661 Standardized coefficients displayed.
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In UK, constraining all coefﬁcients to be equal across the two si-
multaneous ordered probit estimations results in a model that ﬁts the
data no worse than does an output where the magnitude of any of the
coefﬁcients vary. This suggests that the impact of each of the covariates
on the degree of toughness respondents prefer in the economic and
trade and military policy realms is equivalent. We discuss the implica-
tions of this ﬁnding in the section below.
Militarists in the UK want the Government to pursue tougher
China policies, and, although support for globalization and trade
co-varies with favoring softer China policies, the militarism latent vari-
able is the stronger predictor. The most relevant substantive variable,
however, is the respondents’ positions on the general isolationism di-
mension. Those skeptical of foreign entanglements do not want the
British Government to pursue an aggressive China policy. Finally,
those scoring high on patriotism ﬁnd a tougher policy more palatable.
In terms of the control variables, adherents to the Church of England
and Catholic faiths as well as those practicing non-Christian religions
are more favorable to a tougher stance toward China than those who
do not belong to a church. University educated respondents are less
bellicose than those with less than a bachelor’s degree and men want a
less confrontational policy toward China both in the military and eco-
nomic and trade arenas.9 Partisanship is not a signiﬁcant predictor of
the level of toughness the survey respondents’ desire. Despite their sig-
niﬁcance in a number of instances, the explanatory power of the pre-
dictor variables is modest, and the R2 of each of the latent variables
underlying the ordinal toughness scales are just over 0.10.
The American story has important nuanced differences. The magni-
tudes of a majority of the coefﬁcients are equivalent across the
9 The large gender gaps suggesting British women to be significantly more likely to want to
follow a tough China policy are curious and a potential area for future research. On the
one hand, much of the feminist literature argues that women are more pacifistic than men,
but studies of foreign policy attitude qualify this assertion. In her study of Denmark,
Togeby (1994) notes that gender gaps in foreign policy attitudes only emerge in the presence
of left wing and feminist mobilization. In their comparative study of feminist identities,
Hayes et al. (2000) note that British women were no more likely than men to support femi-
nist issues and were significantly less likely than American women to be classified as femi-
nists according to the responses they provided on the cross-national World Values Studies.
In short, a potential reason for the above finding that women in Great Britain actually are
more bellicose toward China might be the antipathy toward feminism observed among
British women, but this is speculative.
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economic and trade and military toughness estimations. Hawkish be-
liefs have the strongest impact on the demand for toughness in both.
However, the impact of believing globalization is a net positive has a
far stronger impact on the desire for a less tough US economic policy
toward China. Favoring globalization remains a signiﬁcant predictor of
a less aggressive military policy, but the strength of this latent variable
on this estimation is muted. Somewhat surprisingly, those high on pa-
triotism are slightly less inclined to see an aggressive economic policy
toward China, but the impact of this latent predictor on military policy
is insigniﬁcant. Finally, conﬁdence in one’s own and America’s eco-
nomic condition suggests a desire for tough policies toward China
across multiple policy realms.10
Unlike the results for the UK, older Americans are far more sup-
portive than the young of taking a tough line toward China, and the
impact is the same across policy domains. Members of all minority
groups want to see the US pursue softer policies toward China, and
unlike the UK, there appear to be partisan differences in policy de-
mands between Republicans and Democrats. The former see tough pol-
icies as more important while the latter favor less aggressive stances.
Protestants and Catholics also want tougher US policies toward China.
A key difference between the estimations across the two samples is the
fact that the covariates included in the American estimations are able
to explain much more variation in the desire Americans have for tough
policies toward China, both militarily and economically.
5.4 Thermometer as a mediator
Given the similarity of the importance the British and American pub-
lic’s place on the toughness of their governments’ China policies across
disparate policy domains, it is a fair question to ask whether the re-
sponses people give to the two outcome variables of interest simply are
reﬂective of general attitudes toward China. To partially test this, we
regress the two threat variables onto a question asking respondents to
evaluate China on a 0–100 thermometer scale and the above
10 This finding that economic optimism co-varies with a more aggressive foreign policy
serves as a nice companion point to recent research showing that poor economic condi-
tions associate with isolationist sentiment (Kertzer, 2013). We return to this point in the
mediation analysis below.
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covariates.11 To capture indirect effects, the feeling thermometer addi-
tionally is regressed on the covariates.
Table 4 reports the results of the estimations of the two toughness
variables on the latent covariates in the presence of the feeling ther-
mometer acting as a mediator. As one would expect, some of the ef-
fects of our variables are mediated by our measure of affect toward
China. Nonetheless, our variables continue to exert direct effects on
support for toughness toward China.
Results from the estimation in Table 4 show that only a small propor-
tion of the effect of Militarism operates indirectly.12 In contrast, a much
larger proportion of the effect of globalization is mediated by the China
feeling thermometer. Interestingly, in the US estimation, there is not a
signiﬁcant direct effect from beliefs about globalization on desires for a
tough military policy, but the direct effect is signiﬁcant and quite strong
when it comes down to preferences for a tough economic policy.
Another interesting result emerges concerning perceptions of the
economy – the direct and indirect effects run in opposite directions.
Even after accounting for standard demographic controls that capture
household income, those conﬁdent about the economy feel warmer to-
ward China, which depresses support for toughness. But positive eco-
nomic evaluations maintain a signiﬁcant and substantively large direct
effect for support for getting tough with China. In other words, more
positive economic outlooks appear to coincide with a more outward
and aggressive looking foreign policy – but this is tempered by the
more positive feelings toward China that also come with more upbeat
economic assessments.
11 We are cautious in stating that we only partially test mediation because there can be a
number of other potential mediators and the extent to which omitted mediators are corre-
lated with the thermometer can lead to the overestimation of the importance of the ther-
mometer’s role as a mediator. However, a thermometer is broad and all encompassing,
requiring less intellectual engagement than more specific questions about the Chinese gov-
ernment, communism, and mediators used in other research (see Gries, 2014b). A number
of other challenges exist in testing for mediation; see Green et al. (2010).
12 Equality constraints are removed in the estimations presented in Table 4. However, the
substantive findings concerning the changes in the magnitude of the direct effects after the
thermometer is added hold regardless of whether the model is estimated with or without
constraints. For example, rerunning the estimations presented in Table 3 without the
model constraints yields standardized coefficients for the Militarism variable of 0.168 on
toughness on Economics and Trade and 0.122 for toughness in military matters in the
UK. Most of the effect of Militarism is direct regardless of constraints employed.
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The direct and indirect effects of partisanship in the United States
are not described in the table but warrant attention. The divide be-
tween Republicans and Democrats exists because the former believe it
is important for the US government to pursue tougher economic and
military policies toward China. Democratic partisanship does not di-
rectly affect the China policy positions – the mediation analysis sug-
gests the signiﬁcant coefﬁcients for Democratic partisanship on display
in Table 3 are an artifact of Democrats feeling warmer toward China
Table 4 Direct and indirect effects of selected predictors on preferences for tough policy
via a china feeling thermometer
Predictor UK economic
and trade
UK military US economic
and trade
US military
Militarism
Direct: 0.140*** 0.093* 0.311*** 0.307***
Indirect: 0.030** 0.029** 0.036* 0.036**
Total: 0.170*** 0.123** 0.348** 0.343***
Globalization
Direct: 0.046 0.048 0.178*** 0.042
Indirect: 0.043*** 0.041*** 0.056*** 0.055***
Total: 0.088** 0.089*** 0.234*** 0.097*
Isolationism
Direct: 0.129** 0.193*** 0.011 0.003
Indirect: 0.008 0.008 0.003 0.003
Total: 0.138** 0.201*** 0.014 0.006
Econ. Eval.
Direct: 0.005 0.023 0.160*** 0.121***
Indirect: 0.022* 0.021* 0.050*** 0.050***
Total: 0.017 0.002 0.110** 0.071†
Patriotism
Direct: 0.089* 0.092* 0.081† 0.052
Indirect: 0.002 0.002 0.017 0.016
Total: 0.091* 0.094* 0.097* 0.035
Notes: Standardized coefficients reported
†P<0.10, *P<0.05, **P<0.01, ***0.001. Coefficients obtained after WLSMV estimation
in Mplus 7.3. Ordered probit estimation of military and economic threat variables onto
covariates. Least squares regression estimation of feeling thermometer onto covariates.
Standard errors of coefficients and other parameters available upon request.
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as a whole. Likewise, the racial disparities in policy preferences we see
in the United States in Table 3 are likely a function of the fact that mi-
norities feel warmer toward China rather than any differences in their
foreign policy preferences. The effect of age, however, is mostly direct.
Older people in the United States place greater importance on the gov-
ernment pursuing tougher policies toward China.
In the UK most of the effect of gender on policies is direct – men want
a more friendly approach toward China. Further, the demands for a
tougher approach toward China among religious adherents are not ﬁltered
through the thermometer. The role of partisanship remains insigniﬁcant.
6 Discussion
This article constitutes a unique opportunity to explore the speciﬁc for-
eign policy attitudes of Americans and Britons in direct, side-by-side,
comparative way. The distributions of our key outcome variables, citi-
zen preferences for tough state China policies in the economic and mil-
itary spheres as well as a chosen mediator – general citizen affect for
China – demonstrates a great deal of concern about China’s rise as a
global power. Britons and Americans are wont to favor tough policies,
the latter more so. Those on both sides of the ‘Special Relationship’
view China coolly in comparison to their western allies. With this in-
formation in mind, we construct a set of rival hypotheses to better un-
derstand the root covariates of this skepticism. In short, we ask
whether broad and abstract foreign policy postures, coupled with vari-
ables standard in models of political choice (economic evaluations and
partisanship), co-vary with the speciﬁc attitudes British and American
citizens have about the level of policy toughness their country should
exhibit in their economic and military policies for China. A summary
of our hypotheses and ﬁndings appears in Table 5.
In both states there is support for Hurwitz and Pefﬂey’s (1987) core
argument that abstract foreign policy postures can explain variation in
the more speciﬁc aspects of foreign policy citizens want their country
to pursue. A key posture in the hierarchical model, ours and theirs,
militarism, associates strongly with British and American demands for
a tough response to the rise of China. Another, isolationism, makes
Britons shy away from preferences for getting tough with China, likely
because they view such actions as needlessly provocative. Support for
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Table 5 Summary of hypotheses and results
Hypothesis Finding
H1: Higher levels of isolationism present
among respondents from the United
States and Great Britain co-varies with a
reduced propensity to support the govern-
ment pursing tough military and economic
policies toward China.
Supported in the UK
H2: Respondents’ positions on the milita-
rism dimension are more closely tied to
their preferences for a tough state military
policy toward China than they are for a
tough economic policy.
Not supported.
H3: Respondent support for globalization
has a significant and negative association
with their preferences for a tough state
economic policy toward China. The magni-
tude of this linkage is larger than the rela-
tionship between globalization and
preferences for a tough military policy.
Fully supported in the US. Significant but
weak relationship that is equal across pol-
icy domains in the UK
H4: The long term attachments of
Americans to a political party, as repre-
sented by their responses to a standard
partisan identification question, will signif-
icantly influence the degree of toughness
they seek from their country’s China poli-
cies—Democratic respondents will favor a
softer approach while Republicans will de-
mand toughness. In Great Britain, respon-
dents’ partisan affiliations will have little
direct effect on attitudes toward the ap-
proach the UK government should take
toward China.
Fully supported in the UK. Mostly sup-
ported in the US. Strong direct relation-
ship between Republican partisanship and
preferences for toughness. Relationship
between Democratic identification and
support for tough policies mediated by
measure of affect toward China.
H5: Economic evaluations affect support
for toughness on China. Those who have
more negative evaluations of the economy
or household finances will support greater
toughness toward China.
Supported in US; not supported in the UK.
(However, refer to text and Table 4 for in-
teresting countervailing direct and indirect
effects.)
H6: Economic evaluations affect support
for toughness on China. Those who have
more negative evaluations of the economy
or household finances will support greater
toughness toward China.
Supported in the UK; not supported in the
US
H7: Respondents’ support for a tough
China policy in both the economic and
military policy realms operates via is a
function of general affect toward China.
Mostly supported. There are meaningful
indirect effects that operate via general at-
titudes toward China. However, in some
cases the direct effect is more powerful
than the indirect effect via the feeling
thermometer. There is also an interesting
countervailing indirect effect for economic
evaluations in the US.
(continued)
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globalization or preferences for free trade also reduce preferences for
tough policies in both states.
Moving away from examining the role of the foreign policy postures
that accord with those found in the work of Hurwitz and Pefﬂey
(1987), we also ﬁnd that a key domestic variable – partisanship, works
as expected. The greater level of partisan polarization present in the
United States leads partisan identiﬁers in this country to be more di-
vided on responses to China than the British. A curious ﬁnding
emerges concerning the relationship between evaluations of personal
and economic ﬁnances and demands for a tough China policy in the
United States (the direct and total relationships are insigniﬁcant in the
UK sample). Americans who are bullish about the economy feel
warmer toward China, but also want tough policies instituted toward
this country. We believe this makes sense – economic prosperity leads
one to embrace a more outward and bold foreign policy (mirroring
Kertzer’s (2013) research showing that economic decline leads to pref-
erences for an inward looking foreign policy). At the same time, eco-
nomic prosperity leads one to view China more favorably, which
decreases support for tough China policies. Further research is neces-
sary to determine how robust is this ﬁnding (there is only minimal sup-
port for the indirect relationship in the UK) and whether it is unique
to situations where citizens have clear preferences and attitudes toward
target countries. The other curious ﬁnding that needs further explora-
tion is the small but signiﬁcant positive relationship between patriotism
Table 5 Continued
Hypothesis Finding
H8: The covariates described in this sec-
tion will have better explanatory power in
explaining citizen preferences for tough
China policies in the United States than in
Great Britain.
Supported.
H9: Americans will utilize different pos-
tures to inform their foreign policy prefer-
ences toward China in the economic and
military domains while the influence of
the postures will be more even across the
two policies among the less informed
British respondents.
Supported
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and the belief that the United States should not be tough toward
China in the economic and trade policy realm.13
Results from testing rival hypotheses and making cross-country
comparisons also are indirectly suggestive of the level of sophistication
citizens have when answering questions about speciﬁc policies. Postures
can be informative shortcuts, but only if the postures are well-
formulated and citizens can make the association between them and
the speciﬁc policy under scrutiny. Results from Table 2 suggest citizens
in both countries have clearly formulated abstract beliefs about foreign
policy that are cross-culturally valid. That the postures in both states
have a direct relationship with the toughness variables without a need
for mediation is evidence of higher order thinking. But we would be re-
miss to not point out that the relationship appears stronger in the
United States. Unlike Britons, American respondents also are more
likely to, albeit in limited circumstances, utilize different postures for
different policy aims. Although foreign policy often is remote from the
day-to-day lives of citizens in both countries the coverage and conse-
quences of China’s rise is more apparent for Americans. Thus, it does
not surprise that the postures and other independent variables do a
better job at explaining American responses than they do in the UK
and that, unlike their British counterparts, interviewees from the
United States utilize different postures in coming to conclusions about
economic and military policies toward China.
7 Conclusions
This article makes several primary contributions to the literature on
public opinion on matters of foreign policy. First, it explores the im-
portant area of attitudes toward China in two key Western states.
Second, the article moves beyond the American case to explore the
similarities and differences in opinion formation on matters of foreign
policy among the British and American publics in the sources of their
attitudes toward China. Third, this article shows that foreign policy
variables continue to play a powerful role in shaping China attitudes
13 One potential explanation is that uncritical patriots tend to be those who believe their
country can do no wrong. If one is hesitant to criticize one’s country, one might also be
reticent to believe that their state’s policies were too ‘soft’.
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even after controlling for simpler heuristics such as country feeling
thermometers, partisanship, and economic perceptions.
Comparing public opinion across countries is difﬁcult because it is
easy to question the cross-cultural validity of the hypothesized con-
structs (cf. Davidov et al., 2011). We show that even though average
scores across countries may differ, Americans and Britons con-
ceptualize postures or dimensions of foreign policy attitudes (milita-
rism, isolationism/internationalism, and globalization), patriotism, and
economic evaluations in a similar manner. This ﬁnding helps reassure
us that the variables take on a comparable meaning across states, and
thus has positive implications for future research on opinion formation
on matters of foreign policymaking in the United States and UK.
Although the ﬁndings presented in Table 2 should be replicated, it
does appear that key foreign policy postures are valid in both coun-
tries. It remains a question whether the cross-cultural validity we ﬁnd
the postures to have hold when comparing more dissimilar states such
as Japan to the UK, France to Australia, and so forth. Seeing if this
ﬁnding holds across a larger set of countries is paramount to the cross-
cultural study of public opinion on matters of foreign policy.
Our argument is that US–UK differences are rooted in the greater
salience of China as a political issue in the United States. Different fac-
tors likely contribute to this greater salience–the greater coverage of
the rise of China in the US media, the visible presence of Chinese
products on the shelves of American stores as well as Britain’s lack of
military interests in the Asia-Paciﬁc and concern with the European
Union. This analysis still leaves fundamental questions unanswered,
and our data alone cannot answer them. Is the greater media coverage
about China in the United States the cause of greater China salience,
or a consequence of greater China salience? Does the US’s role as eco-
nomic and military role as superpower make China a bigger issue be-
cause the United States could choose to challenge her, whereas more
limited British resources simply keep this off the table for the UK? Of
course we expect the opposite as well–issues that are higher salience in
the UK should also result in more nuanced and separable evaluations
among the British public across dimensions that we would ﬁnd in
America (e.g. reactions to policies of the European Union).
The linking of postures to speciﬁc attitudes and noting their points of
variation across states using the issue of China in two policy realms is
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just the tip of what can be a wider cross-cultural project to link individ-
uals’ foreign policy postures to their response to speciﬁc and often remote
foreign policy issues. In the United States, our results show that postures
tied to elements of hard (militarism) and soft (globalization) power are
key predictors of American beliefs concerning the importance of their
country’s tough policies toward China in the military and economic pol-
icy realms. The impact these postures have on speciﬁc policies is mostly
direct and, contra the results suggested by previous work, quasi-
ideological postures do not need to work through the simpler heuristic of
general attitudes toward a country to motivate speciﬁc policy responses.
For respondents from the United States, there is also some (but not
much) differentiation across the two policy domains under observation. In
the UK, where the relevance of China is lower, it is the broader posture
of isolationism that plays the largest role, and the China feeling thermom-
eter is more of a relevant mediator. More exploration should be done as
to whether people’s opinions toward speciﬁc aspects of their country’s for-
eign policies toward another state are a function of speciﬁc or broad pos-
tures. A separate cross-country concern is the extent to which the different
electoral systems (one candidate centered, one party centered) connect the
public’s China preferences to government policy – is there an electoral
connection on the issue of China (see Aldrich et al., 2006)?
Lastly, returning to China, the fact that our multivariate models ex-
hibit more explanatory power when the American sample is considered
suggests that American policymakers have a bit less free space to ma-
neuverer when it comes to setting policy. While it is unlikely that slight
shifts in America’s China policy will swing a presidential election, a
move against the will of the American voters may lead them to question,
ever so slightly, the competence of their leaders. In the UK, this is less
likely to be the case but still possible. Ultimately, a larger research pro-
gram will more ﬁrmly link citizens’ positions on speciﬁc postures and
the ensuing positions on speciﬁc policy beliefs to behavior and attitudes
toward the politicians who make policy. This is a small piece in the puz-
zle of what hopefully will emerge into a larger research program.
Supplementary material
Supplementary material is available at International relations of the
Asia-Paciﬁc online.
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